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agencies within the federal government pay their respective minority and female workers. This emphasis on the internal structure of racial and sexual wage differentials is likely to be useful for two reasons. First, it has been found that there are significant wage differentials among federal agencies for individuals of given skills." Thus it may be reasonable to expect that the relative wage of blacks and women differs among the various agencies. Second, and more important, if the government is assumed to maximize a particular objective function then federal policy regarding the employment of the various sex and race groups should show systematic patterns. Hence an empirical study of black or female relative wages within the federal government can be used to test hypotheses about government behavior.
The analysis presented in this paper assumes that the "government" has a single objective: the maximization of political support.4 This hypothesis predicts how the federal budget will be allocated among the various federal agencies, the wage and employment levels in each agency, and the agency's policy towards the employment of minorities and women in its bureaucracy.5 In particular, the vote-maximization hypothesis predicts that the economic status of minorities in federal agencies depends on how important minorities are to the political support generated by the particular agency. Table 1 presents statistics summarizing various employment characteristics of selected federal agencies. Column 1 gives the total employment (in thousands) of the federal agency. Column 2 gives the percentage of the labor force that is classified as minority in each agency." Column 3 gives the fraction of positions at the upper management levels in the white-collar labor force (defined as a General Schedule [GS] grade greater than or equal to 12) filled by minorities. Finally, column 4 gives the ratio of columns 3 and 2. The differences among federal agencies are dramatic. For example, the largest agency, the Department of Defense, is 18.6 percent minority. Other agencies, like Agriculture or the Tennessee Val- Table 1 also reveal a large dispersion both in the fraction of management jobs occupied by women and in the distribution of women between the lower and higher GS grades among federal agencies.
Of course, these statistics are not conclusive evidence that the votemaximization objective of the government leads to different placement of blacks and women across federal agencies. However, the large differences documented in Table 1 suggest that racial and sexual employment policies in the federal government deserve careful study. Section II presents the theoretical framework for the analysis. Section III introduces a set of observable variables which proxy for the theoretical concepts responsible for shifts in the demand for blacks and women in the government. Section IV documents the existence of large wage gaps between white males and statistically similar individuals in other sex and race groups in federal agencies. It also shows that these "unexplained" wage differentials are partly caused by the government' s attempt to improve the economic status of minorities and women where it is politically valuable to do so. Finally, Section V summarizes the results of the study.
II. THEORY
This section develops a simple hypothesis that creates incentives for federal agencies to take into account the race and sex of workers in their hiring and placement decisions. For concreteness the model will be derived in the context of racial discrimination. The generalization to sexual discrimination is trivial and is discussed below. The main assumption of the model is that a federal agency caters to a "constituency" and that the constituency has tastes for discrimination. The model is, therefore, an application of Becker's concept of consumer discrimination, where the constituents are the consumers of the agency's output.7 j = (w,b),
(1) where p, is the fraction of blacks employed in the agency's labor force.9 It is assumed that all constituents of racej have the same vote function, but there may be differences in the vote function between the two race groups.
The taste discrimination hypothesis is introduced by assuming that whites like seeing whites employed in agency i, and dislike seeing blacks employed in agency i. Similarly the black constituency prefers to see blacks employed. This hypothesis implies that: < 0 (2) apg and > 0.
(2')
Of course, the derivative aVi/8aZ(j = w,b) is positive since more political support is forthcoming from both race groups the larger the level of government services provided to the constituency. The agency's output is produced by a process involving a fixed capital stock and the agency's labor force. It is assumed that black and white labor are perfect substitutes in the production of agency output. Hence the production function is given by:
where Li (j = w, b) is the number of racej workers employed by agency i. Finally, the government is assumed to face a budget constraint: isocost curve is given by BIB1. The isovote function for the political support obtained from agency i is given by equation (3) evaluated at a fixed level of Vi. The optimal hiring of labor inputs requires that for any given budget allocation, the agency's contribution to the government's political support be maximized, as in point e,. Note an important result of the model: the assumption that black and white labor are perfect substitutes in the production of agency output will not, in general, lead to the agency hiring either all black or all white workers. The reason for this result is that black constituents and white constituents perceive black and white labor as different since black constituents prefer dealing with black bureaucrats and white constituents prefer dealing with white bureaucrats. Thus in the production of votes, black and white labor will have different marginal productivities.11 " A condition sufficient for the existence of an interior solution is that the negative utility imposed on whites (blacks) by the government's employment of an additional black (white) is offset by the gain in utility due to the additional output produced by the worker. In other words, the taste effects must be "weak."
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The relative demand function for black labor can be easily derived if an additional technical assumption is made. In particular, if the expression in equation (3) The homotheticity assumption can be justified in two ways. First, if the white vote function, Vt', and the black vote function, Vb, are both homogeneous of the same degree, the agency's vote function, Vi, will be homothetic.'2 Secondly, the homotheticity assumption greatly simplifies the empirical analysis by making the relative demand for black labor independent of both the size of the agency and of the characteristics of other agencies.13
By equating the marginal rate of substitution in the production of votes with the relative black wage, the government is in effect maximizing the utility received by the "average" constituent from agency output. This fact suggests an alternative interpretation for the underlying process. Suppose that in order to maximize votes the government appoints an "effective" agency management. To the extent that the appointed officials are chosen from representative members of the constituency, they will tend to reflect the constituency's tastes. If managers can influence the institutional structure through which the agency hires and places blacks, the resulting demand curve for blacks will depend on the relevant constituency characteristics. A powerful implication of this interpretation is that it is unnecessary to have physical proximity between constituents and bureaucrats in order to generate equation (7). It is not crucial for constituents to see the bureaucrats since the representative constituent managing the agency will make sure that the constituents' tastes are imposed on the agency's personnel policy.
The equilibrium relative black wage and employment in the agency can be determined by introducing a relative supply schedule giving the frac-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 279 tion of black job applicants supplied to the agency at any given relative black wage:14 SS(, yi),
where y, are factors that shift the agency's relative supply curve. This vector may include the fact that certain agencies are concentrated in particular geographic regions and that blacks in that region may be overor underrepresented. Agency relative supply curves also differ because blacks (or whites) may want to provide their labor to particular federal agencies. For example, blacks may be willing to supply their labor to agencies like the EEOC at lower wages than those required to employ them in other agencies or in the private sector. It should be stressed that the assumption of agency differences in the relative supply function is crucial for the analysis. In particular, unless supply schedules varied across agencies, labor market competition would ensure a constant black relative wage for all federal agencies. The optimal relative black wage and employment is given by the simultaneous solution of the relative supply and demand schedules and is illustrated in Figure 2 . 15 It should be clear that factors affecting the demand for blacks by the agency will lead to differences in relative black wages and employment. To illustrate these shifts, consider an increase in the fraction of the constituency that is black, qP. It is easy to show that:
dq P Since a constituency that is mainly black likes to see blacks employed in the agency, the marginal vote productivity of blacks is increased, leading to an increase in the relative demand for blacks in the agency, and to higher relative black wages and employment. Another variable which is likely to influence the relative black wage is the fact that some agencies produce "affirmative action" output. That is, some agencies are primarily (or partly) responsible for enforcing affirmative action programs in the private sector. Define a, as the orientation of the agency's output, with higher values of a, indicating greater minority 14 A necessary condition for the existence of a relative supply curve is that the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage rate be the same for both black and white workers. To analyze the effects of a, on the relative demand for blacks, it is assumed that black constituents like to see blacks employed particularly in agencies producing affirmative action. This taste effect arises because black constituents may think black bureaucrats will be more sympathetic to the output they are producing and hence push harder when implementing affirmative action programs in the private sector. Thus the hypothesis is:
where the agency subscript i is omitted for simplicity. It is harder to hypothesize about the sign of VA. For example, white constituents may benefit from knowing that the agency's affirmative action programs will be administered mainly by black bureaucrats. However, even these white constituents may cut back their support when the zealous bureaucracy starts enforcing quota systems and other forms of "reverse discrimination" in the private sector. Hence Vj may be positive or negative.
It can be shown that: For some major agencies-for example, the Defense Department, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Postal Service-no natural constituencies can be easily identified. In earlier work I resorted to counting the population of states where agency expenditures were made and defining this as the agency's constituency. By analogy, it would seem that if most agency funds are spent on states with relatively large minority populations, the agency's constituency would be mainly black. Define: where f, is the fraction of state l's population that is female.
B. The Production of Affirmative Action
It was shown in Section II that the affirmative action orientation of an agency's output is likely to influence the demand for blacks and females in federal agencies. The special analysis of the U.S. Budget devotes a chapter to the civil rights activities of federal agencies.21 Thus a good empirical counterpart of the theoretical variable can be obtained by looking at actual agency expenditures on civil rights activities. Table 2 lists the civil rights outlays made by federal agencies in fiscal 1979. As can be seen, the federal government spent $486.5 million on such activities in fiscal 1979. These expenditures are made on programs designed to promote fair voting laws, fair housing, equal employment opportunity, and the conciliation and prevention of racial disputes. It is important to note that these expenditures do not, in general, refer to expenditures made by the agency on affirmative action programs for its own personnel. Instead they refer to expenditures made to promote civil rights activities in the private sector. Expenditures made by federal agencies on internal affirmative action programs are allocated to the budget of the EEOC. Thus the expenditure data avoid the simultaneity bias which would exist if agency expenditures on civil rights activities included the expenditures made to improve the status of the agency's minority or female labor force.
Two alternative variables are used in the empirical analysis to measure the minority orientation of the agency. The first is MINOR, which is set 19 The data needed to calculate equation (13) equal to unity if the agency spends money pushing civil rights programs and zero otherwise. The second is CRATIO, defined as the fraction of the agency's budget spent on civil rights activities in the private sector.22
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C. The Role of the Agency's Bureaucracy
In the simple model developed in the previous section, the role of the bureaucracy as a politically powerful institution was ignored. It should be clear that the agency's bureaucrats have incentives to form interest groups or "unions" designed to improve working conditions. Presumably the more homogeneous the agency's bureaucracy the more cohesive its interests and the more likely that a powerful union will be formed to represent its interests.23
It is well known that one of the most important effects of labor unions is to reduce wage dispersion in the firm.24 To the extent that agencies with 22 In constructing CRATIO for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, I include only expenditures made promoting affirmative action programs in the private sector. 23 For a discussion of the role of homogeneity of interests in determining the strengths of a bureaucratic organization, see Borjas, supra note 3. Table 3 presents estimates of the variables introduced in this section for a selected group of federal agencies.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical analysis is restricted to bureaucrats whose CPDF records reported the key variables needed for the analysis. Before proceeding to test the implications of the political model, it is instructive to obtain a detailed view of racial and sexual wage differentials in federal agencies. Table 4 presents relevant statistics on the economic status of minorities and women in the federal government and in each of the thirty-one largest federal agencies. The thirty-one agencies included in Table 4 compose over 95 percent of total employment in the federal government. The first column gives the average log annual (full-time) earnings for white males in each sample. Since the average white annual wage is relatively high it should be clear that even small percentage wage differentials involve sizable dollar differentials.
To measure the wage differential among white males and the other sex and race groups holding observable skills constant, a simple regression technique is used. In particular, the following earnings function is estimated within each federal agency:
In rh = Yha + p Rh + Eh (14) where rh denotes annual full-time earnings of individual h; Yh is a vector of h's socioeconomic characteristics; and Rh is set equal to unity if the individual is a member of a particular sex and race group and zero if he is a white male. Equation (14) will be estimated three times in each agency so as to make pairwise comparisons between white males and each of the other groups.26 In other words, a regression will first be estimated in the 25 The variable o(EDUC) is constructed from the CPDF. It should be noted that in calculating the variables introduced in this section, agencies with fewer than 200 employees were pooled and treated as a single agency. This mainly affected a wide assortment of presidential study commissions. 26 The pairwise regressions are used (instead of a single pooled regression) to allow direct comparisons between the "discrimination coefficients" reported in Table 4 and the many 287 sample of males. This will provide an estimate of the unexplained wage differential between white males and black males. This procedure is then repeated to obtain the remaining sex and race wage differentials (relative to white males). The vector Y includes: education (defined as a vector of 21 dummy variables), years of experience in the federal sector, years of experience in the nonfederal sector (defined as Age-EducationExperience in the federal sector 6), region of employment, whether veteran, and whether physically handicapped. Table 4 gives the estimated 3bm, wf, and 3bf, where Pbm is the estimated /3 for black males; w,f is the statistic for white females; and 3bf is the statistic for black females. As can be seen, in the pooled sample we find that, holding skills constant, there exist significant wage differentials by sex and race so that white males earn approximately 12 percent more than black males and 22-27 percent more than females. The most striking finding is the large variance in the unexplained wage differentials across federal agencies. The white male/black male wage gap ranges from approximately zero to over 30 percent. Similarly, the standardized log wage differential between white males and white females ranged from about 3 percent to 45 percent, while the standardized log wage differential between white males and black females ranges from 2 percent to about 53 percent. The political model developed in Section II predicts that this variation across agencies in the relative earnings of blacks and females is a response to shifts in the political usefulness of hiring these groups in federal agencies. To test these theoretical implications, the empirical properties of the relative demand functions for blacks and females are now analyzed.
A. The Relative Demand Function for Black Males
The agency's relative demand function for black males is given by: bm
rw where rI is the (full-time) annual earnings of race/sex groupj in agency i; xi is the set of variables shifting the agency's relative demand curve for empirical studies in the literature which usually focus on comparisons between two particular sex/race groups. Moreover, this simple way of measuring racial and sexual wage differentials compares very favorably with the more general method of allowing both slope and intercept effects and then calculating the wage differential given the group's average socioeconomic characteristics. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the wage differential given by this methodology and the simpler method in (14) is over .95 for all sex/ race groups. 
where Y is the vector of socioeconomic characteristics described earlier and R is a dummy variable set equal to unity if the individual is a black male and zero if white male. Both the political model and the empirical work in Table 4 
Equation ( 
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Y, the socioeconomic characteristics described earlier, and a few variables which explain level differences in wage rates across agencies.31 Column 1 presents the basic regression using MINOR (= 1 if the agency makes expenditures on civil rights activities), while column 2 uses CRATIO (percent of the agency's budget spent on civil rights activities). As can be seen, all of the coefficients in column I have the right sign and are statistically significant. For instance, the positive coefficient of q, indicates a strong increase in the relative demand for blacks in agencies with predominantly black constituencies. Its magnitude indicates that an increase of 10 percentage points in qP is associated with a 5.8 percent increase in the relative black wage.
The coefficient of MINOR is also strongly positive. The results indicate that blacks working in minority-oriented agencies have a relative wage rate that is 5.6 percent higher than blacks working in other agencies. The interpretation suggested by the model is that constituents of agencies involved in the enforcement of affirmative action programs in the private sector like to see blacks employed particularly in those agencies.
Note also that the coefficient of o-(EDUC) is negative and significant. To the extent that homogeneity of bureaucrats allows a stronger union, and that unions narrow wage inequality in a firm, the negative effect of o-(EDUC) indicates that indeed racial wage differentials are reduced in these agencies. Finally, the coefficient of ^P is strongly negative. This confirms the theoretical prediction that the relative demand curve for black labor is downward sloping.
Column 2 reestimates the relative demand function using CRATIO to proxy for the minority orientation of the agency. The results are qualitatively similar to those in column 1. The coefficient of CRATIO indicates that a 10 percentage-point increase in CRATIO increases the relative black wage by about 5.4 percent. This result, however, is subject to an important qualification: Table 3 shows that the value of CRATIO for the EEOC greatly exceeds the values for the other agencies. Thus the results in column 2 are likely to be sensitive to these outlying observations. For this reason the results in column 1 may be more convincing since the use of MINOR assigns a value of unity to any agency making civil rights expenditures and no outlying observations are created.
An alternative way of controlling for this problem is given in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 where the relative demand functions are reestimated after 31 The variables controlling for agency differences in wage levels are: the size of the constituency, the number of states in which the constituents live, the percentage of the agency's budget distributed in direct grants to individuals and localities, the standard deviation of education, and the percentage of the agency's labor force located in the District of Columbia SMSA. See Borjas, supra note 3. ployed in the agency's labor force. As before, since pi is correlated with the disturbance, an instrument, b{, is used in the estimation. Note that the vector of coefficients y gives the relative demand function for white females. It should be clear that by pooling white males and black females across agencies the same methodology can be used to estimate the relative demand function for black females.
The estimated relative demand functions for white females are presented in Table 6 and those for black females are presented in Table 7 . In both tables, column 1 presents the basic regression using MINOR, while column 1' presents the regression using CRATIO. The results for white females are mixed. The effect of q[ (the percent of the agency's constituency that is female) is strongly positive, indicating that agencies with mainly female constituencies have a higher demand for female labor. Similarly, the effect of or(EDUC) is strongly negative, suggesting that strong unions narrow wage inequality within the agency.
The remaining coefficients in Table 6 , however, do not work out as expected. For example, the sign of MINOR is negative, yet minority orientation has the expected positive sign when it is measured by CRATIO. Moreover, the coefficient of j[ is insignificantly different from zero, so that the negative slope of the relative demand curve for white females is not confirmed by the data.
The estimates of the demand function for black females (columns 1 and 1' in Table 7 ) are more reasonable. All of the coefficients have the correct sign and are generally statistically significant. Thus the relative wage of black women is higher if they are employed in agencies where: (a) the constituency is predominantly female, (b) the agency produces affirmative action, and (c) the bureaucracy is homogeneous. 
